On Mon, Jan 08, 2024 at 17:05:45 +0530, Vivek Kashyap wrote:
>
> If there is even a slight expectation of confidentiality (IMO just
> calling it a 'secret' in documentation is enough to justify that
> expectation) it should be treated as such.
>
> Thus qemu needs to add the possibility to pass it via the 'secret'
> object, so that libvirt can pass it encrypted. On the device commandline
> we'll just pass the alias to the secret.
>
> There's a well documented and maintained way to do that so it should be
> a very straightforward and quick modification.
>
> > Until then the problem is that we are unable to launch the VMs when the PF
> > is in the uesrspace. For now this patch is only bridging the gap to qemu
> > commandline.
>
> The above should be done prior doing this in libvirt so that we can use
> the new approach without having any duplicate code.
>
Yes, that sounds good. We need to add the mechanism to pass the vf-token via
a secret object. However, until it is done we are unable to proceed with our
VMs with PF in the userspace unless we provide the vf-token as in this series.
So for now either a) the qemu commit needs to be revert (so that we can
continue without
providing vf-token uuid), OR
b) We add libvirt support for clear-text vf-token, then add the choice to
qemu to additionally provide the vf-token via a secret object and then
update libvirt to pass the encrypted secret.
As I've stated above, for libvirt we should consider only passing it via
the 'secret' object.