On Tue, Sep 14, 2010 at 05:03:21PM -0400, Ayal Baron wrote:
----- "Daniel P. Berrange" <berrange@redhat.com> wrote:
That is probably possible with the current security driver implementations but more generally I think it will still hit some trouble. Specifically one of the items on our todo list is a new security driver that makes use of Linux container namespace functionality to isolate the VMs, so they
can't even see other resources / processes on the host. This may well prevent the sync manager wrapper talking to a central sync mnager process The general rule we aim for is that once libvirtd has spawned a VM they are completely isolated with exception of any disks marked with <shareable/> In other words, any communictions channels must be initiated/established by the mgmt layer to the VM process, with nothing to be established in the reverse direction.
Correct me if I'm wrong, but the security limitations (selinux context) would only take effect after the "exec", no? so the process could still communicate with the daemon, open an FD and then exec. After exec, the VM would be locked down but the daemon could still wait on the FD to see whether VM has died.
It depends on which exec you are talking about here. If the comms to the daemon are done straight from the libvirtd plugin, then it would still be unrestricted. If the comms were done from the supervisor process, it would be restricted. Daniel -- |: Red Hat, Engineering, London -o- http://people.redhat.com/berrange/ :| |: http://libvirt.org -o- http://virt-manager.org -o- http://deltacloud.org :| |: http://autobuild.org -o- http://search.cpan.org/~danberr/ :| |: GnuPG: 7D3B9505 -o- F3C9 553F A1DA 4AC2 5648 23C1 B3DF F742 7D3B 9505 :|