On Thu, Mar 08, 2007 at 05:33:45PM +0900, Atsushi SAKAI wrote:
Hi, Dan
I and Sunou investivate this issue.
virsh setmem commands directry writes xenstore(memory/target)
by using xenStoreDomainSetMemory()(a)xs_internal.c.
This data (memory/target) is read by PVdomain balloon driver directly.
As you know, xenstore just pass through the data between inter domain.
For this reason, virsh setmem must protect at xs_internal.c not on Xen-side
Ahhh, yes that makes sense. So looks like we have no choice but to
put some protection in libvirt here. Lets have a patch which applies
to xs_internal.c only, and protects Dom0 with a limit of 64 MB. This
avoids imposing policy on non-Dom0, or QEMU/KVM guests.
Regards,
Dan.
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