This patch fixes the secret type checking done in the
virDomainDiskDefParseXML function. Previously, it would not allow any
volumes that utilized a secret. This patch is a simple bypass of the
checking code for volumes.
Signed-off-by: Adam Walters <adam(a)pandorasboxen.com>
---
src/conf/domain_conf.c | 9 +++++++--
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/conf/domain_conf.c b/src/conf/domain_conf.c
index 1d5cc14..be6742a 100644
--- a/src/conf/domain_conf.c
+++ b/src/conf/domain_conf.c
@@ -5494,7 +5494,11 @@ virDomainDiskDefParseXML(virDomainXMLOptionPtr xmlopt,
cur = cur->next;
}
- if (auth_secret_usage != -1 && auth_secret_usage != expected_secret_usage) {
+ /* Bypass this check for volumes. On libvirtd start, pool definitions are not
+ * yet parsed, and thus we can't expect to have a valid expected_secret_usage.
+ */
+ if (auth_secret_usage != -1 && auth_secret_usage != expected_secret_usage
&&
+ def->type != VIR_DOMAIN_DISK_TYPE_VOLUME) {
virReportError(VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR,
_("invalid secret type '%s'"),
virSecretUsageTypeTypeToString(auth_secret_usage));
@@ -18442,7 +18446,8 @@ virDomainDiskDefForeachPath(virDomainDiskDefPtr disk,
if (!disk->src || disk->type == VIR_DOMAIN_DISK_TYPE_NETWORK ||
(disk->type == VIR_DOMAIN_DISK_TYPE_VOLUME &&
disk->srcpool &&
- disk->srcpool->mode == VIR_DOMAIN_DISK_SOURCE_POOL_MODE_DIRECT))
+ (disk->srcpool->mode == VIR_DOMAIN_DISK_SOURCE_POOL_MODE_DIRECT ||
+ disk->srcpool->actualtype == VIR_DOMAIN_DISK_TYPE_NETWORK)))
return 0;
if (iter(disk, disk->src, 0, opaque) < 0)
--
1.8.5.3