Re: [libvirt] [PATCH 5/5] qemu: caps: Use CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE for probing to avoid permission issues

This is mainly about /dev/sev and its default permissions 0600. Of course, rule of 'tinfoil' would be that we can't trust anything, but the probing code in QEMU is considered safe from security's perspective + we can't create an udev rule for this at the moment, because ioctls and filesystem permisions are cross checked in kernel and therefore a user with read permisions could issue a 'privileged' operation on SEV which is currently only limited to root. Signed-off-by: Erik Skultety <eskultet(a)redhat.com&gt; --- src/qemu/qemu_capabilities.c | 11 +++++++++++ src/util/virutil.c | 31 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- 2 files changed, 40 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/qemu/qemu_capabilities.c b/src/qemu/qemu_capabilities.c index 5cf4b617c6..2e84c965e8 100644 --- a/src/qemu/qemu_capabilities.c +++ b/src/qemu/qemu_capabilities.c @@ -53,6 +53,10 @@ #include <stdarg.h> #include <sys/utsname.h> +#if WITH_CAPNG +# include <cap-ng.h> +#endif + #define VIR_FROM_THIS VIR_FROM_QEMU VIR_LOG_INIT("qemu.qemu_capabilities"); @@ -4515,6 +4519,13 @@ virQEMUCapsInitQMPCommandRun(virQEMUCapsInitQMPCommandPtr cmd, NULL); virCommandAddEnvPassCommon(cmd->cmd); virCommandClearCaps(cmd->cmd); + +#if WITH_CAPNG + /* QEMU might run into permission issues, e.g. /dev/sev (0600), override + * them just for the purpose of probing */ + virCommandAllowCap(cmd->cmd, CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE); +#endif + virCommandSetGID(cmd->cmd, cmd->runGid); virCommandSetUID(cmd->cmd, cmd->runUid); diff --git a/src/util/virutil.c b/src/util/virutil.c index 5251b66454..02de92061c 100644 --- a/src/util/virutil.c +++ b/src/util/virutil.c @@ -1502,8 +1502,10 @@ virSetUIDGIDWithCaps(uid_t uid, gid_t gid, gid_t *groups, int ngroups, { size_t i; int capng_ret, ret = -1; - bool need_setgid = false, need_setuid = false; + bool need_setgid = false; + bool need_setuid = false; bool need_setpcap = false; + const char *capstr = NULL; /* First drop all caps (unless the requested uid is "unchanged" or * root and clearExistingCaps wasn't requested), then add back @@ -1512,14 +1514,18 @@ virSetUIDGIDWithCaps(uid_t uid, gid_t gid, gid_t *groups, int ngroups, */ if (clearExistingCaps || (uid != (uid_t)-1 && uid != 0)) - capng_clear(CAPNG_SELECT_BOTH); + capng_clear(CAPNG_SELECT_BOTH); for (i = 0; i <= CAP_LAST_CAP; i++) { + capstr = capng_capability_to_name(i); + if (capBits & (1ULL << i)) { capng_update(CAPNG_ADD, CAPNG_EFFECTIVE|CAPNG_INHERITABLE| CAPNG_PERMITTED|CAPNG_BOUNDING_SET, i); + + VIR_DEBUG("Added '%s' to child capabilities' set", capstr); } } @@ -1579,6 +1585,27 @@ virSetUIDGIDWithCaps(uid_t uid, gid_t gid, gid_t *groups, int ngroups, goto cleanup; } +# ifdef PR_CAP_AMBIENT + /* we couldn't do this in the loop earlier above, because the capabilities + * were not applied yet, since in order to add a capability into the AMBIENT + * set, it has to be present in both the PERMITTED and INHERITABLE sets + * (capabilities(7)) + */ + for (i = 0; i <= CAP_LAST_CAP; i++) { + capstr = capng_capability_to_name(i); + + if (capBits & (1ULL << i)) { + if (prctl(PR_CAP_AMBIENT, PR_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE, i, 0, 0) < 0) { + virReportSystemError(errno, + _("prctl failed to enable '%s' in the " + "AMBIENT set"), + capstr); + goto cleanup; + } + } + } +# endif