On Sat, Jan 13, 2018 at 9:54 AM, <intrigeri+libvirt@boum.org> wrote:
From: intrigeri <intrigeri+libvirt@boum.org>
On startup libvirtd runs a number of QEMU processes unconfined such as:
/usr/bin/qemu-system-x86_64 -S -no-user-config -nodefaults -nographic -machine none,accel=kvm:tcg -qmp unix:/var/lib/libvirt/qemu/capabilities.monitor.sock,server,nowait -pidfile /var/lib/libvirt/qemu/capabilities.pidfile -daemonize
libvirtd needs to be allowed to kill these processes, otherwise they remain running.
Hi intrigeri, I recently had spotted this issue and discussed on IRC but couldn't recreate after a while when I wanted to debug. But the reason and the rule totally make sense. It is a bit unfortunate as it allows random kills essentially, so if anyone is up to we might be better up to spawn those capability probers with a named profile that we can refer to here. But until then the rule here is required to not get into awkward situations. +1 from me, thanks intrigeri
--- examples/apparmor/usr.sbin.libvirtd | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
diff --git a/examples/apparmor/usr.sbin.libvirtd b/examples/apparmor/usr.sbin.libvirtd index a1083b0410..0ddec3f6e2 100644 --- a/examples/apparmor/usr.sbin.libvirtd +++ b/examples/apparmor/usr.sbin.libvirtd @@ -63,6 +63,7 @@
signal (send) peer=/usr/sbin/dnsmasq, signal (read, send) peer=libvirt-*, + signal (send) set=("kill") peer=unconfined,
# Very lenient profile for libvirtd since we want to first focus on confining # the guests. Guests will have a very restricted profile. -- 2.15.1
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-- Christian Ehrhardt Software Engineer, Ubuntu Server Canonical Ltd