On 9/18/17 4:47 AM, Daniel P. Berrange wrote:

On Mon, Sep 18, 2017 at 11:43:57AM +0200, Erik Skultety wrote:

[...]

    > c) what existing communicate interface can be used between libvirt and qemu
    > to get the measurement ? can we add a new qemu monitor command
    > 'get_sev_measurement' to get the measurement ? (step 10)

    Yes, QMP commands seeem most likely.

    > d) how to pass the secret blob from libvirt to qemu ? should we consider
    > adding a new object (sev-guest-secret) -- libvirt can add the object through
    > qemu monitor.

    Yeah, that looks like a viable option too.

So I could see a flow like the following:


  1. mgmt tool calls  virConnectGetCapabilities. This returns an XML
     document that includes the following

      <host>
         ...other bits...
        <sev>
	  <platform-key>...hex encoded PDH key...</platform-key>
	</sev>
      </host>

  2. mgmt tool requests to start a guest calling virCreateXML(),
     passing VIR_DOMAIN_START_PAUSED. The XML would include

      <sev>
        <owner-key>...hex encode DH key...</owner-key>
	<session-info>..hex encode info...</session-info>
	<policy>...int32 value..</policy>
      </sev>


     if <sev> is provided and VIR_DOMAIN_START_PAUSED is missing,
     libvirt would report an error and refuse to start the guest

For ease of use, I would not add this conditional to libvirt. If <sev> is provided and VIR_DOMAIN_START_PAUSED is missing, I’d just send the "GO" command as it would naturally occur. Unless that would confuse things inside libvirt or QEMU in relation to the measurement and secret… Many of our existing tests focus on other aspects of SEV functionality and so they skip the MEASURE/SECRET phase of launch and just go immediately from LAUNCH_UPDATE_DATA (or VMSA) to LAUNCH_FINISH. I guess the key question will be how will QEMU know when to get the MEASUREMENT and wait for a LAUNCH_SECRET before doing a LAUNCH_FINISH when connected to libvirt. Brijesh, this is your area. It feels to me like QEMU will have to wait to do the LAUNCH_FINISH until it gets the first “go” from libvirt. If that’s right, and assuming the same “go” comes from libvirt with or without VIR_DOMAIN_START_PAUSED, then I’d simply exclude the conditional check. QEMU would get the measurement when it is done sending the data. Though in “real world” uses, I think the conditional is perfectly OK.


  3. Libvirt generates the QEMU cli arg to enable SEV using
     the XML data and starts QEMU, leaving CPUs paused

  4. QEMU emits a SEV_MEASURE event containing the measurement
     blob

Speaking of which, I expect QEMU to have a QMP command to retrieve the
measurement, in which case I think libvirt has to provide an API for the user
to retrieve the measurement in case libvirtd crashes somewhere between setting
up QEMU and waiting for the measurement event from QEMU, or simply because the
GO missed the event for some unspecified reason.

Yeah, that's a good point - we also ought to have a pause-reason that
reflects that it is paused due to waiting for SEV secrets.

  5. Libvirt catches the QEMU event and emits its own
     VIR_CONNECT_DOMAIN_EVENT_SEV_MEASURE event containing
     the measurement blob

  6. GO does its validation of the measurement

  7a  If validation failed, then virDomainDestroy() to stop QEMU

  7b  If validation succeeed

     Optionally call

         virDomainSetSEVSecret()

Given the fact that we're likely introducing a new <sev> element to the XML
config, I'm more inclined to utilizing the existing virSecret interfaces (as
was originally suggested) instead of creating a vendor-specific API. You could
have an optional secret sub-element within the <sev> element and libvirt would
simply check if that secret has a value set, once the GO issues
virDomainResume(). Any particular reason for having a specific API for this that
I'm missing?

Initially I was intending to suggest extensive use of virSecret, but it
turns out that despite being called a "secret", none of the SEV data we are
passing around needs protection. Either it is safe to be public, or it is
already encrypted.  So essentially we just have some data blobs we need to
pass into QEMU. I didn't feel we ought to be abusing virSecret as a
general purpose mechanism for passing in opaque data blobs which do not
need any kind of protection.

All of the above looks really good to me. While I agree with Daniel’s analysis of the need for “secret”, I do like using virSecret to convey the notion of secrecy. But it isn’t necessary. The end points are the SEV FW and the guest owner and all secrets they share are already encrypted. Embedding it in the “GO” command feels equally OK to me. Note that sending a secret with a “GO” other than the first one is an error… I don’t think libvirt needs to catch that, though. The SEV FW will.

Regards,
Daniel

Thanks, Richard