On Tue, Jan 31, 2023 at 17:56:09 +0100, Martin Kletzander wrote:
On Tue, Jan 31, 2023 at 05:41:57PM +0100, Peter Krempa wrote:
> On Tue, Jan 31, 2023 at 17:35:59 +0100, Martin Kletzander wrote:
> > On Tue, Jan 31, 2023 at 05:02:15PM +0100, Peter Krempa wrote:
> > > Signed-off-by: Peter Krempa <pkrempa(a)redhat.com>
> > > ---
> > > src/storage/storage_backend_iscsi.c | 4 +---
> > > 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 3 deletions(-)
> > >
> > > diff --git a/src/storage/storage_backend_iscsi.c
b/src/storage/storage_backend_iscsi.c
> > > index e4fa49d05f..01900f6809 100644
> > > --- a/src/storage/storage_backend_iscsi.c
> > > +++ b/src/storage/storage_backend_iscsi.c
> > > @@ -283,10 +283,8 @@ virStorageBackendISCSISetAuth(const char *portal,
> > > &secret_value, &secret_size) <
0)
> > > return -1;
> > >
> > > - secret_str = g_new0(char, secret_size + 1);
> > > - memcpy(secret_str, secret_value, secret_size);
> > > + secret_str = g_strndup((char *) secret_value, secret_size);
> >
> > Unfortunately secrets can contain zero bytes in which case this function
> > would pad everything after the first zero byte with more zero bytes.
> >
> > Fortunately (?) the functions that are called below do not take
> > secret_size, so it won't affect this particular code block, but we might
> > have other problems already existing in the code with this.
>
> Indeed. If the secret itself contains NUL bytes it would indeed not work
> properly, but that's pre-existing.
>
> But with this patch and a NUL byte in a secret we'd actually write
> beyond the end of the buffer below when cleaning up as the cleanup is
> done via
>
> virSecureErase(secret_str, secret_size);
>
> thus attempting to clear more than the string allocated via g_strndup.
>
no, that's fine, g_strndup will allocate secret_size + 1.
Ah right, the documentation says so.
Anyways, we can't do anything about non-C-string passwords here because
virISCSINodeUpdate actually invokes a command with the password as
argument so it must be a C string regardless.