On Friday 15 April 2016 08:56:59 H. Peter Anvin wrote:
On April 15, 2016 3:41:34 AM PDT, Cole Robinson
<crobinso(a)redhat.com>
wrote:
>Libvirt currently rejects using host /dev/urandom as an input
source
>for a
>virtio-rng device. The only accepted sources are /dev/random and
>/dev/hwrng.
>This is the result of discussions on qemu-devel around when the
>feature was
>first added (2013). Examples:
>
>http://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/qemu-devel/2012-09/msg02387.html
>https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/qemu-devel/2013-03/threads.html#00
>023
>
>libvirt's rejection of /dev/urandom has generated some complaints
>from users:
>
>https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1074464
>* cited:
http://www.2uo.de/myths-about-urandom/
>http://www.redhat.com/archives/libvir-list/2016-March/msg01062.html
>http://www.redhat.com/archives/libvir-list/2016-April/msg00186.html
>
>I think it's worth having another discussion about this, at least
>with a
>recent argument in one place so we can put it to bed. I'm CCing a
>bunch of
>people. I think the questions are:
>
>1) is the original recommendation to never use
>virtio-rng+/dev/urandom correct?
>
>2) regardless of #1, should we continue to reject that config in
>libvirt?
>
>Thanks,
>Cole
Using /dev/urandom for virtio-rng, *except* perhaps for a small seed,
it a complete waste of cycles. There is absolutely no reason to have
one prng feed another.
/dev/random is a prng too, both /dev/random and /dev/urandom use exact
same algorithm
and yes, there are multiple reason for feeding one prng with another,
all cryptographic protocols do that all the time (e.g. TLS Pseudo-Random
Function output is fed as key to AES-GCM, both PRF and AES-GCM are
essentially PRNGs)
--
Regards,
Hubert Kario
Senior Quality Engineer, QE BaseOS Security team
Web:
www.cz.redhat.com
Red Hat Czech s.r.o., Purkyňova 99/71, 612 45, Brno, Czech Republic