Keep Coverity happy by passing a pointer to 'dname' rather than the
array itself. The PROBE expansion would cause a BAD_SIZEOF.
---
After all that we're back to this version without the (unknown). I guess
that was my former world sneaking in - have to put something there.
src/rpc/virnettlscontext.c | 7 ++++---
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/rpc/virnettlscontext.c b/src/rpc/virnettlscontext.c
index 0f0ddff..3e7e5e0 100644
--- a/src/rpc/virnettlscontext.c
+++ b/src/rpc/virnettlscontext.c
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
/*
* virnettlscontext.c: TLS encryption/x509 handling
*
- * Copyright (C) 2010-2012 Red Hat, Inc.
+ * Copyright (C) 2010-2013 Red Hat, Inc.
*
* This library is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
* modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
@@ -949,6 +949,7 @@ static int virNetTLSContextValidCertificate(virNetTLSContextPtr ctxt,
const gnutls_datum_t *certs;
unsigned int nCerts, i;
char dname[256];
+ char *dnameptr = dname;
size_t dnamesize = sizeof(dname);
memset(dname, 0, dnamesize);
@@ -1062,14 +1063,14 @@ static int virNetTLSContextValidCertificate(virNetTLSContextPtr
ctxt,
PROBE(RPC_TLS_CONTEXT_SESSION_ALLOW,
"ctxt=%p sess=%p dname=%s",
- ctxt, sess, dname);
+ ctxt, sess, dnameptr);
return 0;
authdeny:
PROBE(RPC_TLS_CONTEXT_SESSION_DENY,
"ctxt=%p sess=%p dname=%s",
- ctxt, sess, dname);
+ ctxt, sess, dnameptr);
return -1;
--
1.7.11.7