Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange(a)redhat.com> wrote:
From: "Daniel P. Berrange" <berrange(a)redhat.com>
Currently any client which can complete the TLS handshake is able to use
the NBD server. The server admin can turn on the 'verify-peer' option
for the x509 creds to require the client to provide a x509 certificate.
This means the client will have to acquire a certificate from the CA
before they are permitted to use the NBD server. This is still a fairly
low bar to cross.
This adds a '--tls-authz OBJECT-ID' option to the qemu-nbd command which
takes the ID of a previously added 'QAuthZ' object instance. This will
be used to validate the client's x509 distinguished name. Clients
failing the authorization check will not be permitted to use the NBD
server.
For example to setup authorization that only allows connection from a client
whose x509 certificate distinguished name is
CN=laptop.example.com,O=Example Org,L=London,ST=London,C=GB
use:
qemu-nbd --object tls-creds-x509,id=tls0,dir=/home/berrange/qemutls,\
endpoint=server,verify-peer=yes \
--object authz-simple,id=auth0,identity=CN=laptop.example.com,,\
O=Example Org,,L=London,,ST=London,,C=GB \
--tls-creds tls0 \
--tls-authz authz0
....other qemu-nbd args...
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange(a)redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Juan Quintela <quintela(a)redhat.com>