On Donnerstag, 22. Oktober 2020 19:07:33 CEST Michal Privoznik wrote:
[Please don't CC random people on patches until asked to, we are
all
subscribed to the list]
Got it, I'll refrain from CCing on libvirt in future.
Not as erratic as it looks like though: I CCed people who touched this
specific AppArmor permission before, plus the virtiofs maintainers.
On 10/22/20 4:58 PM, Christian Schoenebeck wrote:
> Guests should be allowed to create hard links on mounted pathes, since
> many applications rely on this functionality and would error on guest
> with current "rw" AppArmor permission with 9pfs.
>
> Signed-off-by: Christian Schoenebeck <qemu_oss(a)crudebyte.com>
> ---
>
> src/security/virt-aa-helper.c | 2 +-
> 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
>
> diff --git a/src/security/virt-aa-helper.c b/src/security/virt-aa-helper.c
> index 12429278fb..5a6f4a5f7d 100644
> --- a/src/security/virt-aa-helper.c
> +++ b/src/security/virt-aa-helper.c
> @@ -1142,7 +1142,7 @@ get_files(vahControl * ctl)
>
> /* We don't need to add deny rw rules for readonly mounts,
>
> * this can only lead to troubles when mounting / readonly.
> */
>
> - if (vah_add_path(&buf, fs->src->path, fs->readonly ?
"R" :
> "rw", true) != 0) + if (vah_add_path(&buf,
fs->src->path,
> fs->readonly ? "R" : "rwl", true) != 0)>
> goto cleanup;
>
> }
>
> }
Reviewed-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn(a)redhat.com>
but I will give a day or two for other developers to chime in.
Michal
Yes, please wait couple days to see whether there are reactions.
Best regards,
Christian Schoenebeck