[libvirt] [PATCH v3 08/10] qemu: Add secinfo for hotplug virtio disk
Commit id 'a1344f70a' added AES secret processing for RBD when starting
up a guest. As such, when the hotplug code calls qemuDomainSecretDiskPrepare
an AES secret could be added to the disk about to be hotplugged. If an AES
secret was added, then the hotplug code would need to generate the secret
object because qemuBuildDriveStr would add the "password-secret=" to the
returned 'driveStr' rather than the base64 encoded password.
Signed-off-by: John Ferlan <jferlan(a)redhat.com>
---
src/qemu/qemu_hotplug.c | 42 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
1 file changed, 41 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/src/qemu/qemu_hotplug.c b/src/qemu/qemu_hotplug.c
index f695903..fbe3cb8 100644
--- a/src/qemu/qemu_hotplug.c
+++ b/src/qemu/qemu_hotplug.c
@@ -310,6 +310,9 @@ qemuDomainAttachVirtioDiskDevice(virConnectPtr conn,
bool releaseaddr = false;
virQEMUDriverConfigPtr cfg = virQEMUDriverGetConfig(driver);
const char *src = virDomainDiskGetSource(disk);
+ virJSONValuePtr secobjProps = NULL;
+ qemuDomainDiskPrivatePtr diskPriv;
+ qemuDomainSecretInfoPtr secinfo;
if (!disk->info.type) {
if (qemuDomainMachineIsS390CCW(vm->def) &&
@@ -342,6 +345,13 @@ qemuDomainAttachVirtioDiskDevice(virConnectPtr conn,
if (qemuDomainSecretDiskPrepare(conn, priv, disk) < 0)
goto error;
+ diskPriv = QEMU_DOMAIN_DISK_PRIVATE(disk);
+ secinfo = diskPriv->secinfo;
+ if (secinfo && secinfo->type == VIR_DOMAIN_SECRET_INFO_TYPE_AES) {
+ if (qemuBuildSecretInfoProps(secinfo, &secobjProps) < 0)
+ goto error;
+ }
+
if (!(drivestr = qemuBuildDriveStr(disk, false, priv->qemuCaps)))
goto error;
@@ -354,9 +364,15 @@ qemuDomainAttachVirtioDiskDevice(virConnectPtr conn,
if (VIR_REALLOC_N(vm->def->disks, vm->def->ndisks+1) < 0)
goto error;
- /* Attach the device - 2 step process */
+ /* Attach the device - possible 3 step process */
qemuDomainObjEnterMonitor(driver, vm);
+ if (secobjProps && qemuMonitorAddObject(priv->mon, "secret",
+ secinfo->s.aes.alias,
+ secobjProps) < 0)
+ goto failaddobjsecret;
+ secobjProps = NULL;
+
if (qemuMonitorAddDrive(priv->mon, drivestr) < 0)
goto failadddrive;
@@ -374,6 +390,7 @@ qemuDomainAttachVirtioDiskDevice(virConnectPtr conn,
ret = 0;
cleanup:
+ virJSONValueFree(secobjProps);
qemuDomainSecretDiskDestroy(disk);
VIR_FREE(devstr);
VIR_FREE(drivestr);
@@ -393,8 +410,13 @@ qemuDomainAttachVirtioDiskDevice(virConnectPtr conn,
}
failadddrive:
+ if (secobjProps)
+ ignore_value(qemuMonitorDelObject(priv->mon, secinfo->s.aes.alias));
+
+ failaddobjsecret:
if (qemuDomainObjExitMonitor(driver, vm) < 0)
releaseaddr = false;
+ secobjProps = NULL; /* qemuMonitorAddObject consumes props on failure too */
failexitmonitor:
virDomainAuditDisk(vm, NULL, disk->src, "attach", false);
@@ -2791,6 +2813,7 @@ qemuDomainRemoveDiskDevice(virQEMUDriverPtr driver,
const char *src = virDomainDiskGetSource(disk);
qemuDomainObjPrivatePtr priv = vm->privateData;
char *drivestr;
+ char *objAlias = NULL;
VIR_DEBUG("Removing disk %s from domain %p %s",
disk->info.alias, vm, vm->def->name);
@@ -2801,7 +2824,24 @@ qemuDomainRemoveDiskDevice(virQEMUDriverPtr driver,
QEMU_DRIVE_HOST_PREFIX, disk->info.alias) < 0)
return -1;
+ /* Let's look for some markers for a secret object and create an alias
+ * object to be used to attempt to delete the object that was created */
+ if (virQEMUCapsGet(priv->qemuCaps, QEMU_CAPS_OBJECT_SECRET) &&
+ qemuDomainSecretDiskCapable(disk->src)) {
+
+ if (!(objAlias = qemuDomainGetSecretAESAlias(disk->info.alias))) {
+ VIR_FREE(drivestr);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+
qemuDomainObjEnterMonitor(driver, vm);
+
+ /* If it fails, then so be it - it was a best shot */
+ if (objAlias)
+ ignore_value(qemuMonitorDelObject(priv->mon, objAlias));
+ VIR_FREE(objAlias);
+
qemuMonitorDriveDel(priv->mon, drivestr);
VIR_FREE(drivestr);
if (qemuDomainObjExitMonitor(driver, vm) < 0)
--
2.5.5