On 08/22/2014 05:28 PM, John Ferlan wrote:
Since '1b807f92d' - Coverity complains that in the error paths of both virFork() and virProcessWait() that the 'passfd' will not be closed
Signed-off-by: John Ferlan <jferlan@redhat.com> --- src/rpc/virnetsocket.c | 8 ++++++-- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/rpc/virnetsocket.c b/src/rpc/virnetsocket.c index f913365..ce908fa 100644 --- a/src/rpc/virnetsocket.c +++ b/src/rpc/virnetsocket.c @@ -593,8 +593,10 @@ int virNetSocketNewConnectUNIX(const char *path, * behaviour on sockets according to POSIX, so it doesn't * work outside Linux. */ - if ((pid = virFork()) < 0) + if ((pid = virFork()) < 0) { + VIR_FORCE_CLOSE(passfd); goto error; + }
if (pid == 0) { umask(0077); @@ -604,8 +606,10 @@ int virNetSocketNewConnectUNIX(const char *path, _exit(EXIT_SUCCESS); }
- if (virProcessWait(pid, &status, false) < 0) + if (virProcessWait(pid, &status, false) < 0) { + VIR_FORCE_CLOSE(passfd); goto error; + }
if (status != EXIT_SUCCESS) { /*
Unless I'm missing something, passfd will be leaked on all error paths unless virNetSocketForkDaemon succeeds. Jan