"Rasputin" <rasputin(a)email.ru> wrote:
On short read, members of packet header are checked before actually
read.
If uninitialized values can pass the test, they can be set to arbitrary
values while reading remaining portion of a packet.
Buffer overflow is possible. libvirt_proxy is suid-root.
diff -urp libvirt-0.5.1/proxy/libvirt_proxy.c libvirt-dev/proxy/libvirt_proxy.c
--- libvirt-0.5.1/proxy/libvirt_proxy.c 2008-11-20 08:58:43.000000000 +0100
+++ libvirt-dev/proxy/libvirt_proxy.c 2009-01-25 12:51:33.000000000 +0100
@@ -385,7 +385,8 @@ retry:
fprintf(stderr, "read %d bytes from client %d on socket %d\n",
ret, nr, pollInfos[nr].fd);
- if ((req->version != PROXY_PROTO_VERSION) ||
+ if ((ret != sizeof(virProxyPacket)) ||
+ (req->version != PROXY_PROTO_VERSION) ||
(req->len < sizeof(virProxyPacket)) ||
(req->len > sizeof(virProxyFullPacket)))
goto comm_error;
This looks like a good patch.
Thanks!